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IntroductIon
The concept of resilience, or Safety- II, is 
finding its way into national patient safety 
policies. In the Netherlands, for example, 
hospital, professional and patient federa-
tions have named Safety- II as one of the 
three pillars for the new national patient 
safety strategy.1 In July 2019, National 
Health Service (NHS) England and NHS 
Improvement published the NHS Patient 
Safety Strategy which also strives to 
embed Safety- II principles in the national 
policy.2 National policies of any kind 
require a form of public accountability, 
and for quality and safety in healthcare 
this accountability is mostly regulated by 
external, often governmental, regulatory 
authorities. However, while most current 
research on Safety- II addresses activities of 
front- line workers and clinical leadership, 
the role of external regulatory systems 
is hardly addressed.3 The relationship 
between regulation and Safety- II and the 
role regulators could play in improving 
or undermining Safety- II performance, 
needs investigation and theorising.4 5 
In this article, we combine theory with 
practice examples to show how Safety- II 
principles could influence the interactions 
between healthcare providers and their 
regulators.
the core concepts of safety-II
In general, Safety- II is about learning 
from things that go right and improving 
resilience, where Safety- I is about learning 
from things that go wrong and improving 
compliance. The five core concepts of 
Safety- II are:
1. Definition of safety: ‘Safety’ is not de-
fined as the absence of failures or adverse 
outcomes, which is considered ‘Safety- I 
thinking’, but as the ability to make things 
go right.6
2. Safety management: Safety management is 
focused on maintaining adaptive capacity 
to respond effectively to inevitable surpris-
es.7
3. Role of humans: Humans are not seen as a 
risk, but as a resource necessary for system 
flexibility and resilience.7
4. Accident investigation: The purpose of ac-
cident investigations is to understand how 
things usually go right, since that is the ba-
sis for explaining how things occasionally 
go wrong.7
5. Risk assessment: Risk assessment is focused 
on understanding ‘conditions where per-
formance variability can become difficult 
or impossible to monitor and control’.7
In summary, Safety- II is about learning 
from things that go right, with a focus on 
‘Work As Done’ (WAD) instead of ‘Work 
As Imagined’ (WAI), meaning the paper- 
based reality of rules and guidelines. Safe-
ty- II is not intended as a replacement, but 
as a complement to Safety- I. The founding 
fathers of the theory state that the two 
perspectives on safety must co- exist, at 
least for the foreseeable future.6
the core concepts of regulatIon
Regulation is in some countries referred 
to as supervision, scrutiny, oversight 
or inspection. In this article we will use 
the term regulation, which is classically 
defined as control exercised by a public 
agency over activities which are valued 
by a community.8 Although simplification 
does too little justice to the vast body of 
scholarly work on regulation, basically, 
regulation has three objectives9:
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Table 1 The five core concepts of Safety- II, their consequences for accountability and regulation, and examples
Theme
Safety- II concept for the 
theme
Consequences for 
accountability of healthcare 
providers Consequences for regulation Current examples
Definition of safety ‘Safety’ entails that as many 
things as possible go right
Providers will have to report on 
improvements in the number 
of things that go right, and on 
underlying argument on what 
is ‘right’
Providers and regulators need to 
agree on what is ‘right’ and how 
this relates to ‘Work As Done’
Regulators’ use of the Short 
Observational Framework 
for Inspection as method 
for inspectors to assess the 





trying to anticipate 
developments and events
Providers should show they 
have structures and processes 
in place with which to respond 
effectively to unforeseen 
situations
Regulators will use conversations 
with boards and inspections on 
site to assess how consistent the 
boards stories are with experiences 
on shop floor
Regulation of care for the 
disabled through format- free 
Quality Reports that providers 
publish
The human factor in 
safety management
Humans are seen as a 
resource necessary for 
system flexibility and 
resilience. Humans provide 
flexible solutions to many 
potential problems
Focus on (interdisciplinary) 
teamwork, accessibility of higher 
management for healthcare 
professionals’ experiences and 
‘Joy in work’
Regulators should engage in open 
conversation with healthcare 
providers on how they empower 
their employees to fulfil this role 
adequately
Requirement for ‘peer support’ 
after serious adverse events
Accident 
investigation
The purpose of an 
investigation is to 
understand how things 
usually go right as a basis 
for explaining how things 
occasionally go wrong
External accountability will also 
require healthcare providers to 
look into what went wrong
Regulators could combine Safety- I 
and Safety- II by judging whether 
the healthcare provider has looked 
into why the event occurred 
and into what could be done to 
strengthen resilience
Healthcare providers using 
‘functional resonance analysis 
method’ to analyse adverse 
events
Risk assessment Focused on understanding 
the conditions where 
performance variability 
can become difficult or 
impossible to monitor and 
control
Providers should report on how 
the organisation monitors and 
controls performance variability
Regulators can stimulate or 
mandate systems that monitor 
performance variability
Regulators assessing whether 
providers use ‘Quality 
Registries’
 ► To provide assurance that minimally acceptable stand-
ards are achieved.
 ► To provide accountability for levels of performance.
How regulators are meant to do this, is an issue of 
ongoing debate. The past decades have seen a shift 
from compliance- based regulation towards respon-
sive and reflexive regulation.10 11 This development, 
in which inspectors focus less on rules and paperwork 
and more on context and interaction with regulatees, 
can be seen as somewhat similar to the development of 
Safety- II thinking. However, the extent to which regu-
lators make this shift differs per sector. Regulation in 
healthcare is complex and involves a range of agencies 
using different approaches, often dependent on their 
legal mandate. Regulation of pharmaceutical products, 
for example, is grounded in international legislation 
which gives the national regulators little room to tailor 
their interventions. In regulation of elderly care or 
hospitals, national regulators have much more leeway 
to develop strategies fitting to the local values and 
cultures. A common issue in all sectors is that govern-
mental regulators need to account for their actions. 
How both patients, healthcare professionals, politi-
cians and the general public perceive these actions, 
determines the legitimacy and societal value of govern-
mental healthcare regulators.12
Where regulatIon meets resIlIence
Regulation in healthcare is often associated with 
compliance to rules and guidelines, which on face 
value would seem the antithesis of Safety- II. But the 
concepts of regulation and Safety- II are actually quite 
similar; both are about making sense of situations in 
the context of their social dynamics.4 The five core 
concepts of Safety- II can help understand how regu-
lation and Safety- II influence each other (see table 1).
1. Definition of safety: if ‘safety’ is defined as the ability 
to make things go right, a dialogue will be needed on 
what ‘right’ is and how healthcare providers can account 
for their level of performance in ‘getting things right’. 
This is harder than it seems. While ‘wrong’ is often eas-
ily established by the occurrence of unintended harm, 
the absence of harm does not mean that care has ‘gone 
right’. Moreover, there are often different ‘rights’ in play 
and healthcare providers need to compromise between 
those ‘rights’. Abiding by guidelines, for example, does 
not automatically entail providing the ‘right’ care, just as 
driving a car without creating an accident is in itself no 
measure of how safe one drives. Also, a surgeon’s defini-
tion of ‘right’ could be different from a patient’s. Patient 
expertise has already been said to offer opportunities for 
resilience in healthcare,13 and this will be essential in de-
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The regulatory regime could focus on these two elements.
 – How has the healthcare provider defined what it con-
siders ‘right’ and how has it engaged the four per-
spectives (patient, professional, politics, public) in 
this consideration.
 – Does the healthcare provider achieve minimum levels 
of ‘right’ and how does it account for its performance 
in relation to WAD.
An example of a regulatory strategy in this regard is the 
use of the Short Observational Framework for Inspec-
tion (SOFI) as method for inspectors to assess the quality 
of care for people with dementia by observing WAD.14 
Regulators as the English Care Quality Commission 
(CQC), Scottish Care Inspectorate and Dutch Health 
and Youth Care Inspectorate are using SOFI to this end.
2. Safety management: If healthcare providers want to 
move away from rigid guidelines and towards adaptive 
capacity, they will have to find a way to show that they 
have the structures and processes in place with which 
to respond effectively to unforeseen situations. This will 
require inspectors to engage in narrative conversation 
with healthcare providers on how they have organised 
their safety management and follow these up with in-
spections on site to assess how the narrative resonates 
with WAD.
An example of how this could work is seen in regula-
tion of care for the disabled by the Dutch Health and 
Youth Care Inspectorate. Agreement between the main 
stakeholders led to a change in the national policy, shift-
ing away from preset indicators and quality measures 
towards narrative accountability.15 Care providers now 
submit an annual Quality Report which has no speci-
fied format. These are assessed by inspectors and used 
as starting point for open conversations with care pro-
viders. Interestingly, several of these care providers are 
starting to create guidelines for these Quality Reports, 
suggesting unease with the lack of structure in their pro-
cess of accountability.
3. Role of humans: If humans are expected to be a resource 
necessary for system flexibility and resilience, then the 
work environment will need to enable employees to ful-
fil this role. This requires a focus on (interdisciplinary) 
teamwork, easy accessibility of higher management for 
healthcare professionals’ quality concerns and ‘joy in 
work’. Employees will need to be alert enough to recog-
nise things going wrong and empowered to act or speak 
up.
An example of how hospitals organise these elements 
is through the introduction of ‘crew resource manage-
ment’.16 Regulatory oversight would require healthcare 
providers to account for how they empower their em-
ployees to be the resource as intended.
An example of a regulatory strategy that relates to this 
theme, is the requirement of the Dutch Health and Youth 
Care Inspectorate to provide a form of ‘peer support’ for 
employees who were involved in serious adverse events. 
This contributed to an increase of peer support being 
mentioned in adverse event investigation reports from 
40% in 2013 to 100% by 2016 (based on internal data 
from the Dutch Health and Youth Care Inspectorate).
4. Accident investigation: of the five core concepts of 
Safety- II, this one seems the least compatible with the 
core concepts of regulation. When serious unintended 
harm occurs, patients, public and politicians often expect 
answers to what happened, why it happened and what 
is being done to prevent recurrence. An investigation 
exclusively focused on how things usually go right, will 
most likely be interpreted as deflecting responsibility and 
lead to calls for disciplinary action. Here we feel Safety- I 
and Safety- II could be combined. Take, for example, a 
case in which a fatal diagnostic delay occurred because 
an ultrasound was ordered but not executed. A Safety- I 
investigation would look into why the ultrasound was 
not executed, while a Safety- II investigation would look 
into why ordering an ultrasounds in similar situations 
usually goes right. Several healthcare organisations in 
countries like Denmark, Australia and the Netherlands 
are experimenting with Functional Resonance Analysis 
Method (FRAM), the investigation method based on 
Safety- II thinking.17 FRAM tries to identify how health-
care processes usually take place, and define measures for 
improving resilience. Combining FRAM with a Safety- I 
investigation could lead to a higher level of learning and 
align the Safety- II and regulatory goals.
5. Risk assessment: Monitoring and understanding every-
day performance variability has proven to be very de-
manding for healthcare providers. Quality registries 
are an example of how this can be organised. Inspired 
by Sweden, many countries have engaged in setting up 
registries that monitor and try to understand the every-
day performance for specific diseases and treatments, 
mostly for acute hospital care. In the Netherlands, the 
Dutch Institute for Clinical Audits (DICA) supports 22 
of these quality registries and reports annually on quality 
improvements that these have helped realise. Setting up 
and maintaining a quality registry is resource intensive 
and requires commitment from frontline personnel to fill 
in the required data. In 2019, the Dutch Parkinson reg-
istry was abandoned because the administrative burden 
was too high and poor reporting led to outcomes that 
could not be used to improve the quality of care or help 
patients in their choice for a care provider.18
The Dutch Health and Youth Care Inspectorate has 
helped the DICA gain traction by relating several nation-
al hospital quality indicators to DICA registries. This, 
for example, led to a nationwide adoption of the Dutch 
Surgical Colorectal Audit within 2 years. The switch 
from requiring hospitals to have morbidity and mortality 
rounds, to requiring hospitals to include their patients 
in national quality registries, can be seen as an example 
of how regulation can switch from Safety- I to Safety- II.
conclusIon
Although the positive language of Safety- II is appealing, 
actually enacting the principles will be a challenge to 
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require a certain maturity from each actor, internally 
and in its relationship with other actors. The regula-
tory focus will shift from compliance to consistency: 
how does a provider’s WAI as presented by board and 
management play out in WAD as enacted in everyday 
performance? A gap between WAI and WAD is known 
as ‘decoupling’.19 Earlier studies have shown how 
regulators can support the reverse process of recou-
pling in regulated organisations by changing the focus 
from prescriptive regulation based on quality and 
safety indicators to supervision of the management 
system.20 One could call this a move from regulatory 
oversight to regulatory insight. The central challenge 
for regulators will be to give healthcare professionals 
the required level of freedom to tailor quality manage-
ment to their local conditions, while simultaneously 
retaining trust from patient, politics and public that 
the regulator will intervene timely and effectively 
when quality falls short and healthcare providers fail 
to learn from their mistakes. In practice this means 
regulation can probably never be premised exclusively 
on Safety- II.
Nonetheless, regulation has the capacity to actively 
support Safety- II development, and can provide 
mechanisms and structures through which resilience 
is generated across healthcare systems.4 The goals of 
Safety- II are also in line with those of a public regu-
lator. We therefore feel that regulation and Safety- II 
are not the odd couple they might seem, and could be 
at the beginning of a great friendship.
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